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Abstract:
In the U.S., there is a strong passion for professional baseball, football, and, increasingly hockey. An interesting
issue is whether this passion diminished during the recession of 2007-2009, the worst since the Great
Depression, or remained the same. This study investigates the impact of economic downturns on the
professional sports industry. In particular, it examines whether the National Football League, National Hockey
League, and Major League Baseball are recession proof (i.e. minimally impacted by recessions). Using
regression analysis, this study explores the effect of recession and other factors on U.S. attendance and league
revenue for the three professional leagues from 1990 to 2012. While much research has been done concerning
whether other industries are recession proof, not much information exists discussing whether the sports industry
is recession proof.

I.

Introduction
Americans have a passion for professional sports. Baseball is “America’s Pastime”,

Sunday afternoons and evenings are traditionally dedicated to football games, and hockey is
becoming more popular, especially in the Eastern United States, as the Canadian influence
transcends international borders. According to ESPN (2013), in 2007 alone, over 17 million
people attended National Football League (NFL) games, more than 77 million fans attended
Major League Baseball (MLB) games within the United States, and over 15 million
Americans attended National Hockey League (NHL) matches. However, Americans are still
feeling the effects of the worst recession since the Great Depression. WR Hambrecht and
Company Sports Finance (2012, p. 4) reflected on the 2007 to 2009 recession saying, “While
the length of the recession was not unique or overly lengthy from a historical perspective,
what is most alarming is the snail’s pace of growth in the wake of the crisis.” Below is a
graph displaying the total/overall league attendance per year for the three leagues during this
financial crisis.
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The table above indicates how attendance levels for American teams, although
decreasing slightly at points from 2006 to 2012, remained fairly stable throughout the
recession. Therefore, there is evidence, from the most recent recession, that the sports
industry may possibly be recession proof. For the purpose of this study, a recession proof
industry will be defined as an “industry that is minimally impacted by economic downturn . .
.” (Manuel, 2014). Further, a sports industry that is “minimally impacted” by economic
downturn and is thus recession proof has revenue and attendance figures that still reflect
growth, even if these figures are growing at a lower rate. This is based on Michael
Urquhart’s (1981) definition of recession proof. 1 Moreover, this study will explore whether
these industries have been minimally impacted by recessions, as indicated by their attendance
and revenue data, or whether they have been heavily affected by recessions. Evidence
1

Michael Urquhart (1981) finds that recession proof is “The combination of steady growth and relative cyclical
insensitivity . . . however, certain qualifying factors are necessary. The rate of growth is reduced during
downturns, and some components of this division are more cyclically sensitive than others.” Some definitions
argue that recession proof means that an industry must be completely resistant to all economic downturns. This
is too strict of a definition for the purpose of this study.
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towards recession proof leagues comes from data provided by Forbes (2013) which indicates
that from 2007 to 2008, right in the middle of the recession, total league revenue for the MLB
climbed from $5,900,909,733 to $6,021,826,532 (2.04%), while the NHL’s total league
revenue also slightly rose from $2,284,401,772 to $2,286,310,622.2 The NFL total league
revenue grew most substantially from 2007 to 2008 by 2.89% from $7,850,900,000 to
$8,077,799,000.3 This data highlights how as families tried to make every dollar go a little
further, when unemployment was pervasive, and when certain activities had to be eliminated
because of constraining finances, people still attended NFL, NHL, and MLB games. This
warrants a few questions:
1. Starting in 2007, did fewer people attend professional athletic events than when
the country is not in a recession? Is it only for particular leagues that attendance
decreased?
2. Are fewer people still attending these events today because of the recession?
3. Do organizations have to increase ticket prices during recessions in order to
maintain revenue?
4. Are certain professional sports leagues more recession-proof than other
professional sports leagues?
Through this study, some of the questions listed above will be answered while
different questions will also be addressed. To determine if the NFL, NHL, and MLB are
recession proof, this study will compare data from the 1990-1991, 2001, and 2007-2009
recessions to data from non-recessionary years. These are considered official recession years
by the National Bureau of Economic Research (2010). The data for each variable will only
correspond to American teams.

2
3

This includes only American teams’ data.
These numbers, like all numbers in this study, are measured in 2012 American dollars.
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The format of this paper is as follows: Section II reviews related literature. A model
of attendance and revenue is provided in Section III. Data used in the analysis are described
in Section IV. Section V discusses regression estimates of the models. The concluding
section is a summary of the paper with some analysis and insights into the results from the
regression.

II.

Literature Review
Several studies have been conducted that are related to this study. While some of

them do not pertain to professional sports, they are relevant as they analyze factors that
influence industries within a recessionary period.
According to the National Bureau of Economic Research (2010), a recession is
defined as a “decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more than a
few months, normally visible in real GDP, real income, employment, industrial production,
and wholesale-retail sales”. In regards to the sports industry, particularly the NFL, NHL, and
MLB, K.C. Joyner (2008) hypothesized that the only U.S. recession that affected the National
Football League was the 1973-1975 recession. Joyner explains, “. . . attendance dropped by
4.6% from 1973 to 1975 . . . this last bit of information shows that while the league hasn’t
been completely recession proof, it has weathered these financial storms”. In contrast, Koba
(2013) believes that the National Hockey League is the only recession proof league from
2007 to 2012 because, despite an increase in ticket prices, attendance remained steady. He
attributes this trend to hockey fans being more financially affluent than other sports fans.
Lastly, MLB saw record breaking revenues in 2009, thus underscoring how it, too, may be
recession proof.
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A. Factors that Influence Attendance and Revenue:
Borland (2006, p. 23) identifies various factors which contribute to professional sports
league revenue such as the price of a single game ticket, sales of television/internet rights,
and merchandise sales. Downward and Dawson (2000, p.116) also identify various elements
which influence attendance at games. Those include market size, price of tickets, and
income. Downward and Dawson further explain, “. . . market size is a ubiquitously
significant determinant of demand”. These authors conduct an empirical analysis of how
these listed factors affect attendance and revenue. Despite their data not reflecting a
recessionary period, their study provides a model of factors that influence attendance and
revenue. Rottenberg (2001, p. 7) further elaborates, “Attendance at baseball games, as a
whole, is a function of the general level of income, the price of admission to games . . . is a
positive function of the size of the population of the territory in which the team” plays.
Rottenberg highlights that from 1931 to 1950 attendance to games in New York City was
27,270,000 while in St. Louis attendance was only 4,160,000.
Welki and Zlatoper (2001) present a regression analysis on various factors which
influence NFL attendance. They only focus on the 1991 season. The model used in their
study has game-day attendance as the dependent variable and price of tickets, real per capita
income, price of parking at one game, season’s winning proportion of the home team prior to
game day, season’s winning proportion of the visiting team prior to the game, number of
regular season games played, temperature, whether the game is in a dome, whether teams are
in the same division, whether the game is on Sunday or not, Sunday night games, and if the
game is a blackout on television as independent variables.
WR Hambrecht and Co. Sports Finance Group (2012, p. 32), in their analysis of
descriptive statistics, concludes that the “US sports market is an incredibly unique sector for a
multitude of reasons, the most significant of which is that it is highly resistant to the ebbs and
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flows of the economy overall”. The study goes on to say that “attendance and overall spend
[sic] has continued to rise despite the recent economic recession”. Attendance records and
average ticket prices for the NHL, MLB, and NHL from 2006 through 2012 are also
provided. The strength of this study comes from its franchise valuations which reflect a
steady increase in team values from 2006 to 2012. As league revenue and average operating
income per league is further explored, WR Hambrecht asserts that revenue has remained
fairly stable. Team valuations cover every team in the NFL, MLB and NHL which draws a
nice comparison between cities and thus population. The data provided reflects the most
recent recessionary period, and the study analyzes the trends revealed by that period.
Noll (2001) also conducts a regression analysis. He highlights how professional
sports are able to survive and be profitable based on the demand for them. He commences by
going through the a priori factors or independent variables that go into the demand for a
game: a good game versus a bad game, population of the city the game is played in, team
quality, price of ticket, the stadium/arena the game is played in, weather conditions, racial
composition of a city and whether it is a playoff game. Pricing and attendance are the
dependent variables. Noll then presents the regression results for MLB attendance for the
1970 and 1971 seasons. He finds that there is a negative correlation between income and
attendance which highlights that baseball is a “working-class sport”.
Noll also studies the demand for NFL games; he notes that in 1970, roughly twothirds of teams were completely sold out or within only a few thousand fans of doing so. A
regression for the results of the 1970 NFL season attendance is also presented. Football
attendance negatively correlates with income just like baseball. This is because football is
associated with lower per capita income fans and is predominately popular in Southern cities.
Noll provides the same regression analysis for NHL game attendance for the 1972-1973
season. Hockey is a much more regionally based than other sports; it is mostly popular in the
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Northern U.S. and Canada. Despite this study not being conducted using recessionary data, it
is important to note that Noll regards attendance and revenue as key indicators of the success
of a league or organization. In turn, those variables are particularly influenced by income and
the region where the team plays. For Noll, “Attendance is heavily influenced by the size of
the cities’ population: the larger the city, the greater the attendance” (204).

B. Analysis from Parallel Industries
The United States Department of Transportation (2012) explains how the most recent
recession affected the aviation industry. Many airlines introduced additional baggage fees
and reduced the number of flights. These changes, such as fare increases and capacity
reductions, are the main factors that enabled this industry to survive the recession. The U.S.
sports industry can be compared to the aviation industry in that many teams increased ticket
prices in order to maintain revenues. For example, from 2007 to 2008, MLB raised ticket
prices from $25.21 to $26.98, NHL raised prices from $48.87 to $50.15, and NFL raised
ticket prices from $74.31 to $76.98 (Fort, 2012). Despite these being only modest increases,
many teams also offered promotional incentives in order to get people to attend games.
According to Britt (2011), “Teams are also doing a lot more promotions in order to get fans
into the stadium and once at the stadium, there are now a lot more activities to entertain fans
besides the game itself”. For instance, the Pittsburgh Penguins (NHL) organized a successful
campaign with Pizza Hut in which they did commemorative cups featuring different players
each week. This, in turn, encouraged fans to attend the games because these cups became a
collector’s item. Finally, attendance at sporting events during a recession depends on ticket
price and income which is similar to the aviation industry’s fee increases and their effects on
number of people willing to fly.
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Legg and Tang (2012) focus on the effect on the gaming industry of the most recent
recession. This study declares that the gaming industry is not recession proof. Its
methodology is particularly applicable to the current study in that the dependent variable is
gaming revenue while one of the independent variables is attendees. The authors use the
Ordinary Least Squares method, binary recession variables, and annual time-series data for
2001 to 2010. Legg and Tang then perform a one way t test on the binary recession variables
and conclude that the latest recession heavily impacted the gambling industry.
In another relevant study, Hiraide (2012) analyzes the auto industry, particularly Ford
Motor Company, during the most recent recession. The author asserts, “It is hypothesized in
this study that the demand for new vehicles is negatively related to vehicle prices and
gasoline prices and positively related to . . . household income”. Covering over a twenty year
period (1990-2010), the author performs a time series analysis of data on Ford. In the model
used, sales, which is the number of Ford vehicles sold in North America, is the dependent
variable. The independent variables include the average price of Ford vehicles, the average
price of gasoline in the previous year, the units of single family housing starting in the
previous year, total non-farm employment (million), and whether the economy was in a
recession.
One final study is comparable to this study in that it explores the variables which
affect NBA (National Basketball Association) revenue. Jacobs (2009) studies whether losing
affects the revenues of a particular NBA franchise. He uses NBA franchise revenue as the
dependent variable. Some of his independent variables for revenue include gate revenue,
ticket prices, overall league attendance, and national population. Jacobs predicts that gate
revenue is to have a positive effect on revenue, and his analysis confirms this hypothesis. He
also predicts that attendance will positively affect revenue, and this proves to be true as well.
According to Jacob’s study, population also positively impacts the revenue of a team. Lastly,
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he finds, from his model, that ticket prices have a positive and significant effect on franchise
revenue.

III.

Model
In Welki and Zlatoper’s study (2001, p. 221), they reference a survey done by

Schofield (1983b) of factors that affect attendance, and those factors encompass four
categories, three of which are used in the current study. The ones used in this study are
economic variables (e.g., average ticket price, per capita income), demographic variables
(e.g., total national population), and variables reflecting influences or preferences not already
accounted for by the other categories (e.g., average ticket price of substitutes such as average
ticket prices of opposing sports). Therefore, the model created includes these three categories
along with recessionary variables (e.g., percentage of a sport season that was during
recession, unemployment rate) and a variable which indicates the number of teams in a
league per season. For the purpose of the current study, variables that will be pulled from the
Welki and Zlatoper study are price and income; these are independent variables and will be
used to see what influence they have on attendance which is the dependent variable. Finally,
the study presented will use Jacob’s revenue model as the model for overall league revenue
for the NHL, MLB, and NFL. The model follows:
ATTENDANCE= f (PRICE, INCOME, POP, TEAMS, SUBS,
RECESS, UNEMPL, LOCKOUT)
where Table 3 lists the variable names and definitions.

9

(1)

Table 3: Description of Attendance Variables
ATTENDANCE Total League Attendance per year
PRICE

Average Ticket Price per game per season (2012 U.S. Dollars)

INCOME

Real Per Capita U.S. Income per year (2012 U.S. Dollars)

POP

Total National U.S. Population per year

TEAMS

Number of Teams in each league per season

SUBS

Average ticket price of rival sports leagues (2012 U.S. Dollars)

RECESS

Based on NBER recession years – Percentage of months of a league’s
season that occurred during a recession
National U.S. Unemployment Rate per year

UNEMPL
LOCKOUT

Dummy variable used to account for NHL lockout years of 1991-1992,
1994-1995, 2004-2005. 1 = season that followed a recession, 0 = season
that did not follow a recession.

For some of these variables, the expected relationship between them and attendance,
ceteris paribus, is clear. For other factors, contradictory forces prevent the a priori prediction.
Therefore, below are the hypothesized relationships between the independent variables and
total attendance.
PRICE is expected to negatively impact total fan attendance to games. As the average
ticket price per game increases, fans will opt to attend fewer games. Differently, the price of
substitutes will positively affect fan attendance. As the ticket price of a certain league
increases, the number of fans attending another league will increase as a result. For instance,
if the average ticket prices for NHL and NFL tickets fall, people will opt to attend more NHL
and NFL games and fewer MLB games as a result.
TEAMS will positively affect fan total attendance. According to MLB, NFL, and
NHL league history records (2013, 2014), since 1970, the NFL has increased the number of
teams in the league from 26 to 32, the MLB has increased from 24 to 30, and the NHL has
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increased from 14 to 30 teams. In turn, as the number of TEAMS increases so too does total
league fan attendance because there are additional teams for fans to come and watch. For
total national population (POP), it has a positive relationship with attendance. As the
population grows, there will be an increased number of fans who attend sporting events.
The anticipated effect of the remaining independent variables on overall league
attendance remains unclear. Welki and Zlatoper, (2001, p. 222) explain, “How changes in
income (INCOME) will affect game attendance is indeterminate. There have been mixed
results in previous research on the relationship between income and attendance at sporting
events”. Noll (2001, p. 170) finds a “negative correlation between attendance and income”
within baseball and football, but not hockey. Other factors that are also uncertain in their
effects on overall fan attendance include RECESS and UNEMPL. However, as for RECESS,
intuition would say that that during a recession, total fan attendance would decrease. This is
exactly what this study will test. Lastly, UNEMPL mirrors RECESS in that intuition would
say that the higher the unemployment rate, the fewer the number of people who attend
sporting events. This study tests if this hypothesis holds.
Finally, LOCKOUT is an independent variable that will only be included in the NHL
regressions. LOCKOUT has an unknown relationship with attendance in that a year
following a lockout, fans will either be overjoyed to attend games and will attend games in
large numbers or fans will be mad that a lockout occurred and will choose not to attend
games in protest.
Below is the model that includes factors which affect total league revenue during a
recessionary period:
REVENUE = f (GATE, ATT, PRICE, POP, INCOME, RECESS,
UNEMPL, LOCKOUT)
where Table 4 lists the variable names and definitions.
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(2)

Table 4: Description of Revenue Variables
REVENUE

Total League Revenue per year (2012 U.S Dollars)

GATE

Total Gate Receipts per league per year (2012 U.S. Dollars)

ATT

Total League Attendance per year

PRICE

Average Ticket Price per game per season (2012 U.S. Dollars)

POP

Total National U.S. Population per year

INCOME

Real U.S. per capita income per year (2012 Dollars)

RECESS

NBER recession years – Percentage of months of a league’s season that
occurred during a recession
National U.S. Unemployment Rate per year

UNEMPL
LOCKOUT

Dummy variable used to account for NHL lockout years of 1991-1992,
1994-1995, 2004-2005. 1=year that followed a recession, 0=year that did
not follow a recession

Turning to REVENUE, for some of these variables, the relationship between them and
total league revenue, ceteris paribus, is clear. For others, the relationship is uncertain.
Therefore, below is a brief description of the a priori relationships between REVENUE and
its independent variables. These are hypothesized relationships.
GATE and ATT have a positive relationship with REVENUE. The higher the total
gate revenue, the higher the league’s revenue. As for ATT, the greater the total number of
people who attend a game, the higher the total league revenue.
The relationship between PRICE and REVENUE is unclear as it depends on price
elasticity of demand. For instance, as the price of a ticket goes up, if attendance remains the
same because of a perfectly inelastic demand, total league revenue could also increase.
However, if price increases so much so that potential fans do not attend games, then total
league revenue will decrease because there are fewer people going to games. Jacobs (2009)
predicts and proves that ticket price has a positive relationship on NBA total revenues. In
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turn, the relationship between PRICE and REVENUE is dependent on the number of people
who attend games.
The relationship of REVENUE with both POP and INCOME is positive. Jacobs
(2009) explains, “Population is very important to the ability of franchises to generate revenue
because a higher population translates into a larger consumer base for a specific team”.
Jacobs also finds that POP “proved to be extremely significant in the model, having a tstatistic of 5.55”. Similarly, people with a higher INCOME have the ability to spend more
money attending professional sporting events.
The relationship of REVENUE with both RECESS and UNEMPL, the recessionary
variables, is unclear. While intuition would indicate that total league revenue would decrease
during a recession and when unemployment rates are high, this is exactly what this study
wishes to further examine. Because no previous studies explore the effects of RECESS and
UNEMPL on REVENUE, the predictions for these relationships are uncertain.
Finally, LOCKOUT is a variable that will only be included in the NHL regressions.
LOCKOUT has an unknown relationship with REVENUE. In the year following a lockout,
fans will either be overjoyed to attend games and will spend money on the National Hockey
League, thus increasing overall revenue, or fans will be mad that a lockout occurred and will
choose not to attend games or spend money on the NHL in protest, thus hurting revenue.

IV.

Data
The variables and data below used in both equation 1 and equation 2 deal with

information ranging from 1990 to 2012 within the United States and account for only
American teams in the National Hockey League, Major League Baseball, and National
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Football League.4 As a reminder, all dollar values provided in this study have been adjusted
for inflation and reflect real terms based on 2012 dollars.
In equation 1, ATTENDANCE refers to the total, overall league attendance per year
for the NHL, MLB, and NFL, measured in units, as reported by ESPN (2013) and Fort
(2012). PRICE is the average ticket price, in 2012 dollars, per year for each of the three
leagues. The average ticket price for each league was compiled by Fort (2012) and Forbes
Magazine (2013).
INCOME, measured in units, is the U.S. per capita income as recorded by the World
Bank (2014) from 1990 to 2012 and converted into 2012 dollars. POP is the total U.S.
population for the years 1990-2012 in millions. This data was provided by the United States
Census Bureau (2012).
TEAMS refer to the total number of teams in a certain league for a given year, and
this data was also recorded by the National Football League, National Hockey League, and
Major League Baseball (2013, 2014). For the NHL and MLB, Canadian teams were
subtracted out of the total number of teams so as to solely focus on American teams.
SUBS refer to the average ticket prices, in 2012 U.S. dollars, of competing sports
leagues. For instance, MLB’s average ticket price will compete against the average ticket
prices of the NFL and the NHL. All average ticket prices were compiled by Fort (2012) and
Forbes Magazine (2013).
RECESS and UNEMPL are the study’s recessionary variables. RECESS is the
percent of months that a certain league’s games occurred during a U.S. recession. The

4

For Major League Baseball, the Montreal Expos were factored out of all variable data from the years 1990 to
2004, and the Toronto Blue Jays were factored out of the data sets from 1990 to 2012. For the National Hockey
League, the Montreal Canadians, Ottawa Senators, Toronto Maple Leafs, Calgary Flames, Edmonton Oilers,
and Vancouver Canucks were factored out of each category from 1990 to 2012. The Quebec Nordiques existed
from 1990-1994 so they were eliminated from all data sets, and the Winnipeg Jets were factored out from 19901996 and then again from 1999-2012. The reason for taking out the Canadian teams’ data is that this study aims
to focus strictly on U.S. recessions and their impact on American based-teams.
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recessionary period is defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (2010).
UNEMPL, a percentage, is the annual U.S. unemployment rate compiled by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (2014) taken from the July recordings.
Finally, LOCKOUT is a variable that will only be included in the NHL regression, as
the NHL is the only league with more than one lockout over the time span of 1990-2012.
According to National Hockey League (2014), the 1992 lockout postponed thirty games, the
1994-1995 lockout shortened the regular season to forty-eight games, and the 2004-2005
lockout cancelled the entire season. While the MLB cancelled its entire 1994-1995 season
due to strike, this is only one strike as compared to the three within the NHL from 19902012. LOCKOUT refers to whether a season occurred after a lockout, and it is a dummy
variable. 1 = a season that occurred after a lockout and 0 = a season that did not occur after a
lockout. Tables 5,6,7 contain summary statistics on the variables used in the attendance
analysis.

Table 5: Summary Statistics of Attendance Variables for NFL

Notes:

Variables

Mean

Standard Deviation

ATTENDANCE

15,706,926

1,617,349.93

PRICE

62.70

12.87

INCOME

36,132.00

8,916.51

POP

283,643,478

19,828,052.35

TEAMS

30.52

1.62

SUBS (NHL)

54.53

6.14

SUBS (MLB)

21.66

5.00

RECESS

.13

.31

UNEMPL

6.06

1.61

The average was taken for overall league attendance for the years 1992-1998
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SUBS (NHL): ticket price for 1991 is the average of 1990 and 1992 ticket prices, in 2012 dollars =50.39, ticket price for 2004 is
the average of 2003 and 2005 ticket prices, in 2012 dollars = 50.54, ticket price for 2012 is the average of 2013 (60.13) and 2011
ticket prices = 55.63 (required to do this because missing these years due to lockout)
SUBS (MLB): ticket price for 1994 is the average of 1993 and 1995 ticket prices, in 2012 dollars = 15.74

Table 6: Summary Statistics of Attendance Variables for MLB

Notes:

Variables

Mean

Standard Deviation

ATTENDANCE

65,343,910

9,201,632.98

PRICE

21.93

4.94

INCOME

36,566.29

8,873.88

POP

384,577,273

19,770,250.18

TEAMS

27

1.77

SUBS (NHL)

54.54

6.29

SUBS (NFL)

63.38

12.74

RECESS

4.63

21.31

UNEMPL

6.06

1.65

1994 season not included because of strike
Average Ticket Price for 1990 is average of ticket price in 1988 (2012 U.S. dollars equals 11.94) and average ticket price of 1991
SUBS (NHL): ticket price for 1991 is the average of 1990 and 1992 ticket prices, in 2012 dollars =50.39, ticket price for 2004 is
the average of 2003 and 2005 ticket prices, in 2012 dollars = 50.54, ticket price for 2012 is the average of 2013 (60.13) and 2011
ticket prices = 55.63 (required to do this because missing these years due to lockout)

Table 7: Summary Statistics of Attendance Variables for NHL
Variables

Mean

Standard Deviation

ATTENDANCE

14,265,625

2,156,167.45

PRICE

54.91

INCOME

36,355.66

8,456.38

POP

284,163,158

18,681,072.14

TEAMS

21.71

2.00

SUBS (NFL)

63.52

12.33

16

6.64

Notes:

SUBS (MLB)

21.88

4.91

RECESS

.15

.32

UNEMPL

5.99

1.74

LOCKOUT

.16

.37

Seasons not included are 1991-1992, 1994-1995, 2004-2005, 2012-2013 because these are lockout years
Total attendance for 1992-1993 comes from the average of total attendance for 1990-1991 and 1993-1994
Average ticket price for the year 1990-1991 is the average of the average ticket price of 1989-1990 (42.49) and the average ticket
price of 1995-1996, the average ticket price for 1991-1992 is the average of the average ticket price of 1990-1991 and 19951996, the average ticket price of 1992-1993 is the average of the average ticket price of 1991-1992 and 1995-1996, the average
ticket price of 1993-1994 is the average of the average ticket price of 1992-1993 and 1995-1996, and the average ticket price of
1994-1995 is the average of the average ticket price of 1993-1994 and the average ticket price of 1995-1996

In equation 2, REVENUE, measured in 2012 U.S dollars, refers to the total league
revenue per year, adding up each teams’ individual revenues, for each of the three leagues.
This information was gathered by Forbes Magazine (2013) and Fort (2012). GATE refers to
the total gate revenue for a given year for a given league, measured in U.S. 2012 dollars as
reported by Fort (2012). ATT is the total attendance per league per year, measured in units,
and this information was recorded by ESPN (2013) and Fort (2012). PRICE refers to the
average ticket price per year per league, in 2012 U.S. dollars, and this information was
gathered by Fort (2012).
POP, recorded in units, is the total national U.S. population for the years 1990-2012.
This data was provided by the U.S. Census Bureau (2012). INCOME is the U.S. annual per
capita income, measured in 2012 dollars, as recorded by the World Bank (2014).
Lastly, RECESS and UNEMPL are recessionary variables. RECESS is the
percentage of months per season in which games were played during a recession. The
recessionary years are defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (2010).
Unemployment figures reflect the U.S. unemployment rate compiled by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (2014) taken from the July recordings.
Finally, LOCKOUT is a variable that will only be included in the NHL regressions, as
the NHL is the only league with more than one lockout over the time span of 1990-2012.
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LOCKOUT refers to whether a season occurred after a lockout, and it is a dummy variable. 1
= a season that occurred after a lockout and 0 = a season that did not occur after a lockout.
Tables 8,9,10 contain summary statistics on the variables used in this analysis.

Table 8: Summary Statistics of Revenue Variables NFL

Notes:

Variable

Mean

Standard Deviation

REVENUE

5,657,748,348

2,403,946,465

GATE

1,305,044,728

468,178,490

ATT

15,706,926

1,617,349.93

PRICE

62.70

12.87

POP

283,643,478

19,828,052.35

INCOME

36,132

8,916.51

RECESS

.13

.31

UNEMPL

6.06

1.61

The average was taken for overall league attendance for the years 1992-1998
For 1997 league revenue, the average of league revenue of 1996 and 1998 was used
Total gate receipts of 1997 came from the average of total gate receipts of 1996 and 1999, total gate receipts for 1998 was taken
from the average of total gate receipts of 1997 and 1999, total gate receipts for 2000 was taken from the average of total gate
receipts of 1999 and 2002, and total gate receipts for 2001 was taken from average of total gate receipts of 2000 and 2002, and
total gate receipts for 2012 is the same as 2011

Table 9: Summary Statistics of Revenue Variables MLB
Variable

Mean

Standard Deviation

REVENUE

4,313,440,797

15,511,196,500

GATE

1,670,130,282

756,729,349.7

ATT

62,902,941

9,201,632.98

PRICE

21.93

4.94

POP

284,577,273

19,770,250.18

INCOME

36,566.29

8,873.88

18

Notes:

RECESS

4.63

21.30

UNEMPL

6.06

1.65

1994 season not included in data because of strike
Average Ticket Price for 1990 is average of ticket price in 1988 (2012 U.S. dollars equals 11.94) and average ticket price of 1991
Total Revenue for 1998 is the average of 1997 and 1999
Total Gate Receipts for 1997 is the average of 1996 and 1999 gate receipts and the Total Gate Receipts for 1998 is the average of
1997 and 1999 gate receipts

Table 10: Summary Statistics of Revenue Variables NHL

Note:

V.

Variable

Mean

Standard Deviation

REVENUE

2,018,731,492

1,026,686,878

GATE

809,176,231.5

158,414,598.6

ATT

14,265,625

2,156,167.45

PRICE

54.91

6.64

POP

284,263,158

18,681,072.14

INCOME

36,355.66

8,456.38

RECESS

.15

.32

UNEMPL

5.98

1.74

LOCKOUT

.16

.37

1991-1992, 1994-1995, 2004-2005, 2012-2013 seasons are not included in data because lockout years
Total attendance for 1992-1993 came from the average of total attendance for 1990-1991 and 1993-1994
Average ticket price for the year 1990-1991 is the average of the average ticket price of 1989-1990 (42.49) and the average ticket
price of 1995-1996, the average ticket price for 1991-1992 is the average of the average ticket price of 1990-1991 and 19951996, the average ticket price of 1992-1993 is the average of the average ticket price of 1991-1992 and 1995-1996, the average
ticket price of 1993-1994 is the average of the average ticket price of 1992-1993 and 1995-1996, and the average ticket price of
1994-1995 is the average of the average ticket price of 1993-1994 and the average ticket price of 1995-1996
Total gate receipts for 1996-1997 is the average of 1995 -1996 and 1999-2000 total gate receipts, total gate receipts for 19971998 is the average of 1996-1997 and 1999-2000 total gate receipts, total gate receipts for 1998-1999 is the average of 1997-1998
and 1999-2000 total gate receipts, total gate receipts for 2000-2001 is the average of 1999-2000 and 2002-2003 total gate
receipts, and total gate receipts for 2001-2002 is the average of 2000-2001 and 2002-2003 total gate receipts

Estimation Results
This section presents the results from the six regressions that were run. Two separate

models (ATTENDANCE and REVENUE) were run three times each for each of the leagues
(NFL, NHL, MLB) to see which variables have a significant effect on ATTENDANCE and
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REVENUE. Based on the results, one can decide if these three leagues are recession proof.
While all variables are important in explaining what factors influence ATTENDANCE and
REVENUE in these leagues, this analysis will pay particular attention to RECESS and
UNEMPL and their relationship to these dependent variables. Through UNEMPL and
RECESS, this study will decide if each of these leagues are recession proof. The first
recessionary variable, UNEMPL, ignoring any possible lags, tends to increase during a
recession. For example, before the 1991 recession, the unemployment rate in 1990 was 5.5%
and, in 1991, the unemployment rate rose to 6.8%. In 2006, the unemployment rate was
4.7%, and by 2009, it had reached 9.5% (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014). Table 11 shows
the results for the three regressions run on the ATTENDANCE model for each of the three
leagues. The first number in the row is a variable’s estimated coefficient, and the number in
parentheses is the coefficient’s t-statistic. The F statistic, the number of observations, R2, and
the adjusted R2 are provided at the bottom of each table.

Table 11: Regression Estimates of Dependent Variable Attendance in NFL, NHL, MLB

Independent Variable

Intercept
PRICE
INCOME
POP
TEAMS

Expected
Sign
?
_
?
+
+

SUBS
+
SUBS

+

Regression 1
(NFL)

Regression 2
(MLB)

Regression 3
(NHL)

19920222.33
(1.256)
-34594.53
(-0.457)
188.811
(0.967)
-0.101
(-0.957)
387049.908aa
(1.78)
MLB
362226.591aa
(3.228)
NHL

250812274.6bb
(2.487)
1396424.791
(1.398)
4184.916bb
(1.132)
-1.966
(-3.132)
6662994.679aa
(3.691)
NHL
653367.724aa
(2.077)
NFL

-70863905.32
(-1.659)
15026.598
(0.090)
-461.107
(-0.809)
0.365a
(1.585)
242015.866
(0.624)
NFL
-82301.878
(-0.239)
MLB

20

RECESS
UNEMPL
LOCKOUT

_
_

20624.553
(0.483)
-600429.280a
(-1.676)
-141823.285
(-1.14)

-622568.52
(-0.972)
10751.798
(0.294)
1826975.088
(1.923)

53.480
23
.968
.950

19.716
22
.924
.877

?

F-statistic
N
R2
Adjusted R2
a

b

significant at .10 level (one tail test)
aa
significant at . 05 level (one tail test)

-45138.742
(-0.108)
223108.845
(0.186)
-305634.483
(-0.939)
517728.203
(0.643)
9.111
19
.901
.802

significant at .10 level (two tail test)
significant at .05 (two tail test)

bb

ATTENDANCE
Regression 1:
This regression examined the results of 8 independent variables against the dependent
variable of NFL ATTENDANCE. Two of these variables proved to be significant in
affecting NFL ATTENDANCE. The two significant variables at a significance level of .05
were SUBS (MLB) and TEAMS. One variable that was not significant but proved to be
interesting was RECESS. The regression, as a whole, was extremely significant with an R2 of
0.968 and a very high F statistic of 53.480 compared to a low Significance F of 3.537E-09.
According to this regression, 96.8% of the variation in ATTENDANCE can be explained by
the independent variables. This regression includes 23 observations.
SUBS (MLB) was hypothesized to positively affect NFL ATTENDANCE, and the
hypothesis failed to be rejected. As MLB ticket prices increase, more people will attend NFL
games. This also implies that the NFL is a closer substitute to the MLB than the NHL.
SUBS (NHL) positively related to ATTENDANCE, as predicted, but was not significant.
This is not surprising in that hockey is a more regional sport than football and baseball which
are popular across the U.S. Noll (2001, p.200) elaborates, “The long hockey tradition in
eastern Canada is obviously reflected in attendance figures for that area, and the spread of
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hockey’s popularity has been more rapid and complete in regions where winter weather
permits hockey to be played more extensively”.
TEAMS was also hypothesized to positively affect NFL ATTENDANCE, and this
hypothesis failed to be rejected. TEAMS had a p-value of .0484. As predicted, the more
teams in the league, the higher the attendance. RECESS, although not significant, was very
close to being significant with a p-value of .05799. This result indicates that NFL games
played during a recession negatively impact NFL ATTENDANCE. Because RECESS, a
recessionary variable, was nearly significant, this implies that the NFL ATTENDANCE may
be affected by recessions. Greg McFarlane (2011) explains, “The NFL’s immunity to
economic hardship is a classic example of how wonderful it is when a third party picks up the
tab. It starts with the NFL’s own acknowledgment that 95% of fans never attend a game”.
He argues that the NFL remains recession proof because of TV revenues as the NFL “goes
out of its way to accommodate you. There are multiple camera angles, replays and instant
access to scoring drives on the Red Zone Channel, which is better than life itself. All you
have to do is keep your eyes glued to the screen”. Leeds (2006, p.521) further elaborates that
TV is “the lifeblood of the NFL . . . A significant decline in TV revenue could cause several
teams to sustain operating losses”. Finally, McFarlane and Leeds argue that the NFL remains
recession proof partly through the league’s ability to accommodate fans at home through
television outlets. However, because RECESS is nearly significant, this highlights how
RECESS hurts fan attendance.
The rest of the variables proved to be insignificant. This can be attributed to the issue
of multicollinearity in which some of the variables included in the regression overlap one
another causing certain variables to be insignificant; Table 13 in the Appendix provides the
correlation matrix for NFL ATTENDANCE. When running a separate regression, in an
effort to account for multicollinearity, when PRICE was eliminated, RECESS, SUBS (MLB),
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and TEAMS were all significant at the .05 level. RECESS was significant with a p-value of
.02695. According to these results, when average ticket price was eliminated, the number of
months the NFL holds games during a recession significantly and negatively affects
ATTENDANCE as proven by the coefficient of -666663.577. In having this variable affect
ATTENDANCE negatively, even with television revenue, this highlights how the NFL is not
completely recession proof as overall attendance is negatively impacted during a recession.
For example, according to the ESPN (2013), in 2006, overall NFL attendance was 17,509,509
and, in 2008, attendance decreased to 16,190,099 which displays how the NFL suffered
attendance loss during the most recent recession.
Turning back to the initial regression which did not consider multicollinearity,
ATTENDANCE was not significantly impacted by any other variables except SUBS (MLB)
and TEAMS. PRICE negatively affected ATTENDANCE, as predicted, but was not
significant; INCOME was positively related to ATTENDANCE but was also not significant.
POP, which was predicted to positively affect overall attendance, appeared negatively related
to ATTENDANCE but was also insignificant. One reason that POP may not be related to
ATTENDANCE is because POP is highly correlated with other variables such as INCOME,
TEAMS, and SUBS (MLB).
Finally, UNEMPL was not significant but negatively related to ATTENDANCE as
predicted. This means that as the unemployment rate increases, ATTENDANCE decreases.
However, UNEMPL should not be considered when deciding if NFL ATTENDANCE is
recession proof because it was not significant. In contrast, although not fully significant in
the first regression, when collinearity was considered, RECESS was significant. This
indicates that NFL ATTENDANCE may not be recession proof as one of the two
recessionary variables proved to be significant and negatively related to ATTENDANCE.
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Regression 2:
The second regression, under the ATTENDANCE model, included 8 variables against
the dependent variable of MLB ATTENDANCE. Three of the variables were significant in
this regression, and two variables, although not significant, provided interesting results. The
three variables that were significant at the .05 level include TEAMS, INCOME, and SUBS
(NHL). The variables which were not significant but are interesting to explore include
UNEMPL and POP. This regression had an R2 of 0.924 which means that 92.4% of the
variation in MLB ATTENDANCE is explained by the independent variables. This
regression also had 22 observations as the 1994 data, due to a strike, was eliminated.
TEAMS was hypothesized to positively affect overall attendance as the more teams in
the MLB, the more opportunity people have to attend games. The results failed to reject the
hypothesis as the p-value of .001336 proved to be positively significant with
ATTENDANCE. As noted earlier, this relationship is not surprising as Major League
Baseball increased the number of teams from 24 teams in 1970 to the current number of 30
teams (Major League Baseball, 2013). INCOME, which had an indeterminate hypothesized
relationship, positively affected ATTENDANCE with a p-value of 0.0079 and a coefficient
of 4184.916448. This is a surprising result in that Noll (2001, p.171) finds a very different
relationship between ATT and INCOME. He explains, “Given the negative correlation
between attendance and income, baseball appears to be a working class sport”. While Noll
(2001, p.190) argues that baseball is more “successful in cities with lower average income,”
that is not necessarily true as, today, there are ranges of seat options. People with higher
incomes can sit in box seats or club seats whereas people with lower incomes can sit in
regular seating or in the grand stand which are cheaper seats. Therefore, INCOME should
not negatively impact ATTENDANCE, arguably, because there are ranges of seating prices
that accommodate any level of income.
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Lastly, the hypothesized relationship between SUB (NHL) was positive because as
NHL ticket prices increase, the number of people attending MLB games will increase. The
results indicate a significantly positive relationship between SUBS (NHL) and
ATTENDANCE with a p-value of 0.0291. While these results contradict the earlier findings
in Regression 1, which showed that NFL ATTENDANCE and MLB (SUBS) had a
significant relationship, one possible reason for why SUBS (NHL) is significant and not
SUBS (NFL), within this regression, is that the NHL and MLB seasons overlap with one
another for more months of the year. While MLB typically runs from April to late October,
the NHL (October until June) overlaps with the MLB four months of the year while the NFL
(September to February) overlaps with MLB only in the months of September and October.
POP, hypothesized to have a positive relationship with ATTENDANCE, was not
significant in the appropriate one-tail test, even with a p-value of .00395, because it has an
unexpected negative coefficient of -1.966. This is extremely interesting in that, typically, the
higher the population, the greater the demand to attend games. One way to justify this
inverse relationship, despite it being insignificant, is that even with an increasing population
in a given city, this does not necessarily mean that the increased population contains MLB
fans.
One variable which was not significant but is interesting to explore further is
UNEMPL. Intuition finds that the higher the unemployment rate, the lower the number of
people who attend MLB games. Within this study, the unemployment rate had an unexpected
positive coefficient with a t-statistic of 1.923, thus it also was not significant. Many
economists argue that the MLB is recession proof, as shown by neither RECESS nor
UNEMPL being significant, because MLB finds ways to get its fans to attend games even
during economic downturns. Klayman (2008) explains than in the 2007-2009 recession, the
San Francisco Giants offered, “. . . a $25 gas card through August when fans buy four game
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tickets online for $75”. He also comments, “Baseball was there during the Depression,
during World War II, as an element of the country's recovery from 9/11, and will continue to
be available at affordable prices”. Lastly, Klayman cites Andrew Zimbalist as saying, “The
evidence of past recession is indeed that sports is one of the last things that people cut back
on . . . They need their distractions and they need their obsessions”. Similarly, the fact that
UNEMPL was positively related to ATTENDANCE also highlights how individuals still
attend games even with high unemployment rates; this will be discussed further in the
analysis of Regression 4. RECESS, although not significant, was positively related to
ATTENDANCE; this simply highlights how individuals still managed to attend games even
during a recession. Therefore, MLB ATTENDANCE, based on the non-significant positive
results of RECESS and UNEMPL, appears to be recession-proof.
Finally, the remaining two variables of SUBS (NFL) and PRICE were both
insignificant and do not heavily influence ATTENDANCE. Despite PRICE not being
significant, it is also interesting to explore. Over the three recessions, average real ticket
prices generally increased slightly from $13.53 in 1990 to $15.12 in 1991, $22.75 in 2000 to
$23.36 in 2001, and $25.24 in 2006 to $28.79 in 2009. While PRICE generally increased
during a recession, this did not prevent people from attending MLB games as PRICE proved
to be insignificant in relation to ATTENDANCE; teams found that they could increase
PRICE to maintain revenue because fans would still attend games during a recession. Further
evidence of this is found in Regression 5 in which PRICE is positively related to MLB
REVENUE.

Regression 3:
Within this regression, 9 variables were examined against NHL ATTENDANCE.
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The regression’s R2 was 0.901 and its F-statistic was 9.111. This means that 90.1% of the
variation in NHL ATTENDANCE can be explained by the independent variables. Despite
this, none of the independent variables proved to be significant at the .05 level when
individually examined against NHL ATTENDANCE. There are several possible
explanations for this. The first explanation may be that within the data set ranging from
1990-2012, there were four lockouts. These years were eliminated from the regression which
means there were four less data sets to work with than the NFL and three less than MLB
(1991-1992, 1994-1995, 2004-2005, 2012-2013).
The second possible explanation is the issue of multicollinearity; the Appendix
provides the correlation matrix for NHL ATTENDANCE in Table 14. When running a
second regression to consider collinearity, PRICE and TEAMS were eliminated. As a result,
two variables were significant. One was POP and the other was UNEMPL. The predicted
relationship between NHL attendance and POP was that the higher the population, the more
fans attend NHL games. With a p-value of .0286 and a positive coefficient, this regression
failed to reject the hypothesis. Moreover, the hypothesized relationship between UNEMPL
and ATTENDANCE was negative in that the higher the unemployment rate, the lower the
overall NHL attendance. The regression results failed to reject this hypothesis with a p-value
of 0.00725. Therefore, without PRICE and TEAMS, NHL ATTENDANCE shows signs of
not being recession proof because it was affected by UNEMPL; the greater the UNEMPL, the
lower the ATTENDANCE.
Returning back to the original regression, the third possible reason that none of the
variables proved individually significant is that seven of the of the twenty-three NHL teams
are Canadian. Because the NHL is so regionally based and is extremely popular in Canada,
excluding Canadian teams’ data may have skewed attendance figures. For instance, in 2012,
NHL total attendance was 21,470,155 (Fort, 2012). Canadian attendance made up 5,941,424
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of that 21,471,155 which is approximately 27.67% of overall attendance. This is a fairly high
percentage and may account for the large number of insignificant variables.
Koba (2013) argues, “Only hockey among the four major pro sports was able to have
greater attendance now than before the Great Recession”. He finds that this is the case
because “Hockey fans are also more affluent than in other sports . . . the NHL can jack up the
ticket prices more than other sports and still keeps its fans”. Lastly Koba calculates hockey
fans average per capita household income at approximately $104,000 compared to MLB fans
at $96,000 and $94,500 for NFL fans; this is measured in 2013 U.S. dollars. However,
Koba’s argument is difficult to accept because in both regressions, the first one and the
second one (when considering collinearity), INCOME was not significant which highlights
how an individual’s INCOME does not affect his/her NHL ATTENDANCE.5 Therefore, this
finding disproves Koba’s assertion that income matters and causes this study to return to the
second NHL regression which considers collinearity. When collinearity is considered, which
appears to be the stronger argument for the high number of insignificant variables, UNEMPL
is significant. This implies that the NHL may not be recession proof as the higher the
unemployment rate, the lower the ATTENDANCE. Finally, turning to the other variables
considered in the original regression, LOCKOUT, POP, SUBS (NFL), SUBS (MLB), and
TEAMS were all insignificant
Table 12 provides the results for the second regression run based on REVENUE for
NFL, MLB, and NHL. The first number in the row is a variable’s estimated coefficient, and
the number in parentheses is the coefficient’s t-statistic. The F statistic, the number of
observations, R2, and the adjusted R2 are provided at the bottom of each table.

5

It is important to note that, as seen in Table 14, INCOME is highly correlated with other variables such as
ATT, POP, SUBS (NFL), and SUBS (NHL).
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Table 12: Regression Estimates of Dependent Variable Revenue in NFL, NHL, MLB

Independent Variable

Intercept
GATE
ATT
PRICE
POP
INCOME
RECESS
UNEMPL
LOCKOUT

Expected
Sign
?
+
+
?
+
+
?
?

Regression 5
(MLB)

Regression 6
(NHL)

-9498870120
(-1.268)
1.741aa
(2.481)
222.261aa
(2.016)
-22721762.33
(-1.099)
19.201
(0.567)
123587.895aa
(2.567)
92614736.05
(0.446)
147576016.3bb
(4.968)

8618129521bb
(3.397)
0.089a
(1.528)
24.801aa
(3.708)
98418001.66bb
(3.676)
-58.875
(-4.724)
218518.824aa
(9.212)
-1833944.672
(-1.463)
89178194.73bb
(4.862)

703.105
23
.997
.996

561.281
22
.996
.995

52016293632
(0.863)
5.621
(1.079)
-250.014
(-0.800)
118278957.4
(1.360)
-306.209
(-0.932)
750035.035
(1.099)
-1135221133
(-1.066)
413581748.5
(1.233)
-6835045.303
(-0.011)
2.575
19
0.673
0.412

?

F-statistic
N
R2
Adjusted R2
a

Regression 4
(NFL)

b

significant at .10 level (one tail test)
significant at . 05 level (one tail test)

aa

significant at .10 level (two tail test)
significant at .05 (two tail test)

bb

A. REVENUE
Regression 4:
The fourth regression included 7 independent variables examined against NFL
REVENUE. Overall, the regression had a high R2 of 0.997 and F statistic of 703.105. This
means that 99.7% of the variation in NFL REVENUE can be explained by the independent
variables. Four of the variables proved to be significant at the .05 level of significance and
those include GATE, ATT, INCOME, and UNEMPL. This regression included 23
observations.
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GATE was predicted to have a positive relationship with REVENUE, and the
hypothesis failed to be rejected. With a p-value of 0.0127 and a coefficient of 1.741, the
higher the GATE, the greater the NFL REVENUE. These results coincide with ATT in that
the higher the ATT, typically, the greater the GATE and thus the higher the REVENUE.
ATT was also positively significant with a p-value of 0.031. Therefore, the higher the ATT,
the greater the NFL REVENUE.
The next variable that was significant was INCOME with a p-value of 0.0107.
INCOME was predicated to positively affect REVENUE, and this hypothesis failed to be
rejected. Therefore, a person with a higher INCOME has the ability to spend more money on
the National Football League. The last significant variable was UNEMPL with the p-value of
0.0001. Intuition argues that the higher the UNEMPL, fewer people attend games or are less
inclined to spend money on the NFL which lowers REVENUE. The results reveal that
UNEMPL was positively related to REVENUE. According to the positive coefficient of
147576016.3, as UNEMPL increases, so too does REVENUE. The first possible explanation
for this is that even though those who are unemployed cannot or do not attend games during a
recession, those who are wealthy or middle class choose to attend NFL games and spend
money on the NFL. This contradicts Noll’s (2001, p.194) argument when he asserts,
“Football attendance, like baseball, is negatively associated with income”. Noll neglects to
consider that REVENUE remains high because the middle class and wealthy continue to
spend money on the NFL. Differently, another reason UNEMPL may be positively related to
REVENUE is that even the unemployed, who are on a fixed income, need sports as a release
from every day stresses. Klayman (2008) finds that “Sports are a great distraction from the
economy”. Klayman, in his article, interviewed a fan who was laid off during the 2007-2009
recession, and the fan commented that he still attended sporting events saying, “. . . it kind of
perks me up, at least for a minute anyway”. Therefore, even those who are unemployed opt
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to spend money and attend, as indicated by the significant ATT variable of .0310, NFL
games. Finally, under both possible explanations, the fact that UNEMPL and REVENUE are
positively related indicates that NFL REVENUE may be recession proof.
Three variables that proved insignificant in relation to REVENUE were PRICE, POP,
and RECESS. PRICE, with a p-value of 0.289, was negatively related to REVENUE. POP,
with a p-value of 0.290, was positively related to REVENUE, as predicted, because as POP
rises, REVENUE is expected to rise as well. Lastly, RECESS, insignificant with a p-value of
0.662, highlights how a recession has little to no effect on NFL REVENUE. Despite being
insignificant, RECESS was positively related to REVENUE which means REVENUE still
increases during a recession. In conclusion, with a positive RECESS variable, although not
significant, and a positive UNEMPL variable, which was significant, NFL REVENUE
appears recession proof.

Regression 5:
The fifth regression tested seven variables against MLB REVENUE. The regression
produced an R2 of 0.996 and a high F statistic of 561.281. This means that 99.6% of the
variation in MLB REVENUE can be explained by the independent variables. Four of these
variables proved significant at the .05 level and those include ATT, PRICE, INCOME, and
UNEMPL. RECESS and GATE, although not significant, are interesting to explore further.
There were 22 observations in this regression.
Firstly, ATT was predicted to positively affect REVENUE and, with a p-value of
0.00117, the hypothesis failed to be rejected. This means that as ATT goes up, so too does
MLB REVENUE. Likewise, INCOME was expected to positively impact REVENUE, and
this also proved true. With a positive p-value of 1.28E-07, the higher the INCOME, the more
people will opt to spend money on Major League Baseball.
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PRICE was positively significant with a p-value of 0.002. This means that as PRICE
increases, so too does REVENUE. During the most recent recession, MLB PRICE rose from
$25.21 in 2007 to $28.23 in 2009. While this is only a slight increase in PRICE, it was
enough to accumulate some additional MLB REVENUE.
The final significant variable was UNEMPL with a p-value of 0.000252 and with a
positive relationship to REVENUE. This positive relationship to REVENUE is similar to
NFL REVENUE’s relationship to UNEMPL. There are several reasons for this positive
relationship. The first explanation directly contradicts Noll’s (2001) argument that baseball
is a “working class sport”. This coincides with the discovered positive relationship between
MLB REVENUE and INCOME. While Noll finds that baseball is a “working class sport”
because he discovered a negative correlation between income and MLB attendance, this
study found a positive relationship between MLB REVENUE and INCOME which counters
Noll’s argument. Those who attend games during an economic downturn may be middle
class or wealthy individuals who can afford to spend money on Major League Baseball.
Similarly, several MLB teams opened new stadiums during the 2007-2009 recession. Those
teams include the Yankees, whose new stadium opened April 2009, and the Mets who also
opened a new stadium in 2009. These franchises were able to charge premium prices for
certain tickets in these new stadiums. Those who could pay for these premium tickets were
more willing to do so because they wished to see these new, state of the art stadiums.
Therefore, despite UNEMPL increasing and the possibility of the unemployed not being able
to attend games, those who can afford to go to games will choose to go.
The second reason that UNEMPL and REVENUE may be positively related is
because those who are unemployed still opt to attend MLB games and spend money on MLB;
this is the same reasoning as NFL REVENUE in relation to UNEMPL. Klayman (2008)
interviewed a Chicago Cubs fan, recently laid off from work, and the man explained, “The
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tickets cost a lot, but that’s what you have savings for, for special events”. Therefore, even
those who are unemployed find value and desire to spend their money on Major League
Baseball.
Two variables which proved to be insignificant include RECESS, with a p-value of
0.166, and GATE, with a p-value of 0.07. RECESS was negatively related to REVENUE,
and GATE was positively related to REVENUE. In RECESS not being significant, one can
assume that a recession does not influence MLB REVENUE. This indicates that the MLB
may be recession proof as RECESS does not influence MLB REVENUE and UNEMPL is
positively related. Lastly, GATE was positively related to REVENUE, as expected, but it
was not significant. One reason that GATE may not be significant is that ATT and GATE
have a high collinearity of .78 which means that because ATT was significant, it prevented
GATE from also factoring into REVENUE.
Surprisingly and counter to the prediction, POP was negatively related to REVENUE
but was also not significant. It was not significant in the appropriate one-tail test since it had
an unexpected negative sign in relation to REVENUE.
In conclusion, in UNEMPL being positively, significantly related to MLB REVENUE
and RECESS not being significantly related, this implies that MLB REVENUE may be
recession-proof as REVENUE shows signs of growth even during a recession.

Regression 6:
The final regression explored 8 variables and their effects on NHL REVENUE.
Overall, the regression had an R2 of 0.673 and F statistics of 2.575. This means that 67.3% of
the variation in NHL REVENUE was explained by these 8 variables. None of the variables
proved to be significant individually at the .05 level of significance. The main explanation
for this is the issue of multicollinearity; the correlation matrix for NHL REVENUE is Figure
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15 of the Appendix. When considering collinearity and eliminating POP, INCOME was
significant with a p-value of 0.04878. This indicates that as INCOME increases so too does
NHL REVENUE as more people will invest in the National Hockey League when they have
a higher income.
Other reasons why the variables failed to be significant are similar to those mentioned
in Regression 3 concerning NHL ATTENDANCE. Primarily, this regression only contained
19 observations because four years of data were eliminated due to lockouts. Another reason
is that Canadian teams’ statistics were eliminated from the data sets. Because hockey is so
regionally based and 7 out of the 23 NHL teams are based in Canada, as discussed
previously, eliminating Canadian teams may have hurt the regression results. According to
Forbes (2012), in the 2011-2012 season, the 7 Canadians NHL teams combined to make up
$774 million dollars in revenue out of the $5.6 billion made in the season for the entire
league. Also, when it comes to total revenue per team for the 2011-2012 season, three
Canadian NHL teams were ranked in the top ten for highest team revenues for the season.
The Toronto Maple Leafs came in first place with revenue at $200 million, the Montreal
Canadians came in third place with revenue at $169 million, and the Vancouver Canucks
came in seventh place with revenue at $143 million. It is clear, through revenue figures, that
excluding the Canadian teams may have disrupted the accuracy of the NHL regression
results.
Moreover, it is important to explore the relationship between REVENUE and its
insignificant variables. GATE was positively related to REVENUE as predicted, but ATT
was negatively related to REVENUE which counters the hypothesis. PRICE, despite being
insignificant, was positively related to REVENUE. POP was negatively related to
REVENUE, and, as seen in the previous regressions, despite POP increasing, it does not
necessarily mean that it contains NHL fans. As predicted, INCOME was positively but
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insignificantly related to REVENUE. LOCKOUT, which was only included in the NHL
regressions, proved to be insignificant, but negatively related to REVENUE. This indicates
that REVENUE tends to be lower following a LOCKOUT.
Lastly, the two recessionary variables of UNEMPL and RECESS were insignificant.
UNEMPL, if it was significant, would positively affect REVENUE. This, like with NFL and
MLB REVENUE, explains that fans will continue to spend money on the NHL even when
they are unemployed or wealthy/middle class attendance and support makes up for the
unemployed people who are no longer able to attend games or spend money on the NHL.
RECESS would be negatively related to REVENUE, if it was significant, which means that
NHL REVENUE would decrease during a recessionary period. Because both RECESS and
UNEMPL do not strongly affect NHL REVENUE, there is not enough evidence, and the
results are not strong enough to dub the NHL recession proof.

VI.

Conclusion:
The goal of this study was to determine whether the NFL, MLB, and NHL were

recession proof based on the results of the recessionary variables’ (UNEMPL and RECESS)
impact on the dependent variables of ATTENDANCE and REVENUE. As defined in the
introduction, for the purpose of this study, a recession proof league reflects any league which
continues to show growth, even if this growth slowed, in its ATTENDANCE and REVENUE
figures. ATTENDANCE and REVENUE are two indicators that define a successful league
versus an unsuccessful league as a team with higher overall attendance and higher total
revenue is more successful than one that is stagnant in these categories. While focusing on
whether these leagues were recession proof, this study also created a model which included
other, non-recessionary factors which affect ATTENDANCE and REVENUE. These
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variables were included in order to see what affects annual league attendance and revenue
within or not within a recession.
It can be concluded that one league appears to be recession proof, another is partially
recession proof, and another does not have strong enough results to prove it is recession
proof. Foremost, the only league which proved to be completely recession proof is Major
League Baseball. This is because people still attend games and spend money on Major
League Baseball even with high unemployment rates. Support for this conclusion is further
provided by concrete data. In 2006, MLB overall attendance was 73,776,554 and, by 2008,
attendance was 76,191,330 (ESPN, 2013). Growth also occurred in MLB REVENUE in that
REVENUE, in 2006, was 5,641,908,115, and by 2008, it was 6,021,826,532.
The NFL shows signs of being recession proof but is not completely unaffected by
economic downturn. NFL ATTENDANCE is not recession proof as RECESS impacted
ATTENDANCE negatively. Concrete data to support this can be seen as NFL overall
attendance in 2006 was 17,606,057 and decreased by 2008 to 16,190,099. The NFL
recovered since the 2007-2009 recession with 2012 figures at 17,178,573. Differently, NFL
REVENUE shows signs of being recession proof. In UNEMPL being positively significant
against REVENUE, fans opt to spend money on the National Football League even when
there is higher unemployment. In 2006, NFL REVENUE was 7,466,999,000 and grew to
8,077,799,000 by 2008. This underscores how REVENUE remains generally unaffected by
economic downturns. Finally, one cannot assert that the NFL is completely recession proof
as attendance decreases and fails to grow during an economic downturn. However, the NFL
is not completely hurt economically during a recession because the league is able to grow in
its REVENUE sector. Therefore, the NFL is partially recession proof.
The NHL is not recession proof for several reasons. Foremost, because UNEMPL
was negatively significant when collinearity was considered, it is impossible to argue that
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NHL ATTENDANCE is recession proof. In 2008, NHL overall attendance was 16,209,885.
By the 2009 season, ATTENDANCE decreased to 15,686,771. These numbers highlight
how NHL ATTENDANCE cannot be recession proof. The NHL has seen a slight recovery,
since the 2007-2009 recession, in that 2012 ATTENDANCE increased to 16,133,902.
Moreover, NHL REVENUE is also not recession proof as neither UNEMPL nor RECESS
significantly affected REVENUE; in both recessionary variables not being significant, one
cannot boldly assert that NHL REVENUE is recession proof. There is not enough evidence
to make such an assertion.
Other non-recessionary variables proved to be significant when testing against
ATTENDANCE and REVENUE; this shows what factors go into affecting ATTENDANCE
and REVENUE even when not in a recessionary period. SUBS (MLB) and TEAMS were
significantly and positively related to NFL ATTENDANCE. TEAMS, INCOME, and SUBS
(NHL) positively affected MLB ATTENDANCE. GATE, ATT, and INCOME were
positively and significantly related to NFL REVENUE. ATT, PRICE, and INCOME all
heavily influence MLB REVENUE.
While this study is helpful in looking into which league is recession proof, which
league shows signs of being recession proof, and which league is not recession proof, there
are several areas that could be explored further in the future. Within the REVENUE model,
one of the goals was to indicate which variables, overall, affected league revenue. However,
some variables, such as TV/Internet contracts, merchandise sales, and concession sales, were
not included in the model. These variables were excluded from the model due to largely
incomplete data sets. If someone wished to create a more comprehensive model for
REVENUE, they could look more deeply into these excluded variables and see how much
they impact REVENUE and REVENUE during a recession.
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Another way to expand upon this study would be to see if team record during a
recession would impact ATTENDANCE and REVENUE for these leagues. Does a winning
team have greater revenues and attendance during a recession than a losing team? Coinciding
with this, it would also be interesting to see if certain areas with sports teams are more
recession proof. For instance, is a team in Boston, which is a larger city with a very good
NHL team most years, better able to withstand economic downturns than a team like Buffalo,
a smaller city with a generally mediocre NHL team? How does record and location coincide
with one another to affect ATTENDANCE and REVENUE during and not during a
recession?
Lastly, the LOCKOUT variable should be explored more closely within future
studies. How does a LOCKOUT affect REVENUE and ATTENDANCE? Does a
LOCKOUT more negatively affect the NHL than a recession? Does a LOCKOUT positively
affect the NHL and, if so, how much does the NHL benefit? Within this study, LOCKOUT
was insignificant, but, in future studies, it would be interesting to explore why a LOCKOUT
is insignificant. Finally, it would also be stimulating to see how influential a LOCKOUT is
on the NHL as compared to a recession.
The hopes for this study were threefold. Firstly, it was to underscore how pivotal
these leagues are in the lives of Americans. Secondly, it was to explore an unprecedented
study. Thirdly, this study hopes to inspire further analysis on the subject so leagues and
teams can be aware of what influences ATTENDANCE and REVENUE most heavily to
avoid economic hardships during future recessions.
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VII.

Appendix

Table 13: NFL Attendance Correlation Matrix

ATT

PRICE

POP

INCOME

RECESS

UNEMPL

TEAMS

SUBS

SUBS

(MLB)

(NHL)

ATT

1

PRICE

0.9228417

1

POP

0.9221705

0.9860284

1

INCOME

0.9209274

0.9739584

0.9920144

1

RECESS

-0.048394

0.0151373

-0.030584

0.04169

1

UNEMPL

0.0476237

0.224871

0.2836274

0.25398

-0.2035

1

TEAMS

0.9410993

0.9023066

0.9264060

0.91861

-0.051

0.12315

1

(MLB)

0.9453879

0.9828919

0.9791751

0.9703

-0.0054

0.27005

0.91717

1

SUBS

-

-

-

(NHL)

0.1708347

0.1041316

0.2077369

-0.2817

-0.1712

-0.44611

-0.24911

-0.2041

SUBS

1

Table 14: NHL Attendance Correlation Matrix

ATT

LOCKOUT

PRICE

POP

INCOME

RECESS

UNEMPL

SUBS

SUBS

(NFL)

(MLB)

ATT

1

LOCKOUT

-0.254

1

PRICE

-0.011

-0.2384051

1

POP

0.875

-0.2737818

-0.3089

1

INCOME

0.837

-0.2551563

-0.3904

0.98964

1

RECESS

-0.089

-0.2135997

-0.2287

0.05650

0.149641

1

UNEMPL

0.076

0.038103369

-0.4666

0.32671

0.284953

-0.207019

1

SUBS (NFL)

0.883

-0.3078074

-0.1873

0.98607

0.971054

0.091161

0.2637873

1

(MLB)

0.865

-0.2811380

-0.2773

0.98205

0.969605

0.064663

0.3127728

0.9829

1

TEAMS

0.885

-0.38719

0.0441

0.83141

0.806019

-0.008741

-0.060422

0.8569

0.8579

TEAMS

SUBS
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1

Table 15: NHL Revenue Correlation Matrix
REVENUE

GATE

ATT

LOCKOUT

REVENUE

1

GATE

0.638786

1

ATT

0.650712

0.922955016

1

LOCKOUT

-0.27309

-0.3144171

-0.25461024

1

PRICE

POP

INCOME

RECESS

PRICE

-0.09868

0.078883222

-0.01156102

-0.23841

1

POP

0.754138

0.804518365

0.875469984

-0.27378

-0.3089

1

INCOME

0.72276

0.74869771

0.837938575

-0.25516

-0.3904

0.989646859

1

RECESS

-0.08682

-0.08478589

-0.08939747

-0.2136

-0.2287

0.056506654

0.149642

1

UNEMPL

0.3448

0.03204798

0.076089417

0.038103

-0.4666

0.326716446

0.284953

-0.20702
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UNEMPL

1
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